DRONE INGRESS - A CRISIS WE ARE BEING LEFT TO FACE ALONE

The number of drone drops is increasing, but POA warnings about the scale of the threat and demands for action have not been heeded

Across the UK prison estate, a quiet but rapidly escalating crisis is taking hold, one that frontline POA members are being left to confront with wholly inadequate support. Drone drops are no longer isolated incidents. They are now a routine feature of prison life. Organised crime has identified a critical weakness in prison security and is exploiting it with growing confidence, delivering drugs, weapons and mobile phones directly into our establishments with alarming ease. Yet, despite the scale of the threat, the response from HMPPS and the UK government remains painfully insufficient.

Current operational guidance to staff speaks volumes about the lack of a meaningful response. Officers are instructed to contact the control room, maintain visual contact if safe, activate bodyworn cameras, secure the area and complete incident reports.

Let’s be clear: this is not a solution to a modern and evolving threat. It does nothing to stop the drone, nothing to prevent the drop and nothing to protect staff in real time. At best, it ensures the incident is properly documented after the fact. POA members are effectively being told to stand, observe and report while organised criminals breach prison security from the air. That is not security, it is surrender.

Every drone entering prison airspace represents a direct and immediate danger. We are already seeing the consequences: drugs fuelling violence and instability, weapons entering already volatile environments and prisoners gaining access to communication devices that strengthen organised crime networks outside the walls. Staff are left to deal with the aftermath, on landings, in yards and behind locked doors, managing the violence, the debt and the intimidation that follows. This is placing frontline officers at serious and unnecessary risk.

We should consider ourselves fortunate that, so far, a firearm has not been successfully delivered into a UK prison by drone, but this is not beyond the realms of possibility. It is entirely achievable with the technology currently available. When prisoners can already coordinate precise deliveries of contraband into our establishments, escalation is not a leap; it is a progression. If that line is crossed, the consequences will be catastrophic. We cannot continue relying on luck.

At HMP Frankland, we have already seen the consequences of delayed action. In 2025, three members of staff narrowly avoided losing their lives in a serious incident. It was only after that near tragedy that movement was seen on long-standing POA demands for tasers and body armour. These were not new ideas or reactive innovations; they were measures consistently called for over time and ignored until events forced action. That must serve as a stark lesson. When the POA raises safety concerns, it is not speculation; it is grounded in the daily reality faced by frontline staff. Yet, with drone ingress, the same pattern is repeating. The risk is clear, the warnings have been made, the solutions exist and, still, the necessary action is delayed.

The government has now announced a £35m investment to install heavy-duty steel grilles on up to 13,000 prison cell windows across 17 prisons identified as vulnerable to drone activity. This has been presented as a significant step forward in tackling the issue. In truth, it highlights the limitations of the current approach. Steel grilles are not a counter-drone strategy. They are a measure to deal with the consequences after a breach has already occurred. They do not stop drones entering prison airspace, they do not prevent drops into exercise yards, onto roofs or into other open areas, and they do not disrupt or deter the organised criminal groups responsible. They offer no realtime protection to staff. This is not prevention, it is containment.

The scale of the response simply does not match the scale of the threat. Drone activity around prisons has increased by 770% in just four years. Against that backdrop, only 17 prisons are being targeted, with measures that are largely passive and defensive. There is no clear national rollout plan, no commitment to active interception capability and no transparency around what happens next. There is little clarity on which prisons will be prioritised, how risk is being assessed or what success will actually look like. This is not a coherent national strategy, it is a limited response.

Despite the recognition of the threat, the message to staff remains unchanged: see it, report it. The emphasis continues to be placed on reporting sightings, supporting police investigations and pursuing prosecutions after the event. By the time any enforcement action begins, the drone has already delivered its payload and disappeared. That is not deterrence, it is damage control.

What makes this situation even more frustrating is that the technology to tackle this threat exists. Effective systems are already in use in high-risk environments, including drone detection and tracking, signal disruption and denial technologies, GPS interference and interception tools. These capabilities are proven, developed and available. The issue is not one of possibility, it is one of priority.

Every failure to invest in meaningful countermeasures sends a clear message to those on the frontline: your safety is not a priority. Because if it were, prevention would come before reaction, and staff would be properly equipped to deal with the threat they face. Instead, officers are left managing the consequences: drug-fuelled violence, the introduction of weapons and the continued influence of organised crime operating inside our prisons, while security is undermined from above.

When prisoners can effectively order contraband via drone delivery, we have to ask a fundamental question: what has happened to prison security? We have moved from prevention to reaction, from control to containment. That is not progress, it is regression.

The POA has been consistent and clear in its position. There must be investment in effective anti-drone technology, the development of a coordinated national strategy, genuine engagement with frontline staff and decisive action taken, before serious incidents occur, not after. The experience at HMP Frankland should have been a turning point. It demonstrated the cost of delay and the consequences of ignoring those who understand the risks best. Instead, we find ourselves again issuing warnings ahead of a preventable crisis.

The current approach to drone ingress is failing. It relies on reporting rather than prevention, places responsibility on staff without equipping them to act and delivers partial solutions to a systemic threat that is only growing in scale and complexity. The recent government announcement may represent a step forward, but it is nowhere near enough to meet the challenge.

Until there is a clear national strategy, the deployment of active counter-drone capability and proper investment aligned to the level of risk, we will remain in the same position, reacting after the fact while the threat continues to evolve.

The lesson from Frankland is clear: when the POA raises concerns, they must be acted upon before lives are put at risk. Because if we continue down this path, it is not a question of if something catastrophic will happen, but when. And when it does, the question will not be what went wrong. It will be why the warnings were ignored, again.